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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
Relations between the United States and the 
European Community have been taxed for the past 
several years. With enlargement from six to nine members, 
the Community devised a broad agenda at the 1972 Paris 
Summit aimed at full economic, monetary, and possible 
political union. As the EC has sought to fulfil! this 
mandate, tensions with the United States have increased 
not only in trade relations but also in the areas of 
security and political cooperation. 
During the Copenhagen Summit of December 14-15, 1973, 
the EC leaders focused on the need for a speedier European 
union and a European identity in international relations, 
the energy crisis, and the backlog of Community work 
that had accumulated during the first year of expanded 
membership. The Nine also stressed their intention 
to "maintain their constructive dialogue and develop their 
cooperation with the United States on the basis of 
equality and in a spirit of friendship." 
Major threats to Atlantic economic prosperity 
have resulted from the oil crisis, growing balance-of-
payments deficits, and an unstable monetary system. A 
rational debate must be continued to clarify misunder-
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standings over issues jointly confronting the United 
States and the European Community. 
This manual attempts to expose prevailing myths 
and rectify them through facts about the Community 
and its policies, especially as they pertain to the 
United States. The material contained herein should 
not be used merely as the means of confronting myth 
or misconception with fact, for this approach alone 
can be irritating and counterproductive. The dialogue 
can be best advanced if it is placed in a wider context 
of general and common objectives which can benefit 
jointly the United States and the Community. 
Trends of the Community's growth and development are 
shown for the years 1958-72. Since EC enlargement to 
nine member states in 1973 changed the Community's entire 
economic dynamics, trends cannot be shown past that point. 
Patterns for the Nine will be discernible only after the 
three new members complete their tariff alignment with 
the Six, in 1977. 
- iv -
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I. POST WORLD WAR I I: 
HOW INTEGRATION BEGAN 
For centuries, a unified Europe has been the dream of 
many European philosophers, poets, and statesmen. The French 
romantic poet Victor Hugo once prophesied: 
"I represent a party which does not yet exist: 
The party of revolution, civilization. 
This party will make the Twentieth Century. 
There will issue from it first 
The United States of Europe, then 
The United States of the World." 
The first steps toward political and economic union 
were taken in the aftermath of World War II. Aware of the 
need for Franco-German reconciliation, British Prime Minister Win-
ston S. Churchill proposed the creation of "a kind of United 
States of Europe." His suggestion was backed by the United 
States which. through the Marshal! Plan, made $13 billion 
available to 16 European nations for the reconstruction of 
a democratic Europe. 
The US offer was contingent upon the Europeans' willingness 
to cooperate among themselves. Thus the Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was born in 1948. 
Fullfilling the US condition, the OEEC created a European 
Payments Union to facilitate international exchanges. 
The countries which would become the Common Market of 
Six received a total of approximately $7.2 billion in Marshal! 
1950-58 
10-1-74 2 
Plan aid. Of that total, $6.4 billion was in grants and $756 
million in loans. Approximately 97 per cent of the loans have 
been paid back with payments still being made and interest 
accruing on the remainder. The three new member countries 
received $2.8 billion in grants and $546 million in loans of 
which 42 per cent has been repaid.* 
In 1948,the Council of Europe was formed grouping 
the future West European North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) powers but omitting the trans-Atlantic partners. The 
Council, instead of becoming the starting point for a United 
States of Europe, remained an inter-parliamentary debating 
fonnn. 
Progress was too slow for some impatient Europeans 
advocating European unity. They envisaged a rebirth of 
economic strength and political cohesion through unity and 
an end to the ancient conflicts which had divided Europe for 
so long. 
"Europe will not be built all at once, or through a 
single comprehensive plan," Robert Schuman, French Foreign 
Minister, had said in 1950. "It will be built through 
concrete achievements, which will first create a de facto 
solidarity . . . " 
In 195~European integration was born when Robert Schuman, 
acting on a proposal of Jean Monnet, launched the idea of a 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) designed to create 
a common market in Europe for coal and steel. Six countries 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg 
* US Agency for International Development, Office of Statistics 
and Reports. 
US Goals 
For Europe 
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signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951. For various political 
reasons, the British ~overnment did not respond. 
The rule of unanimity which had for so long impeded 
the growth of international organizations was abandoned and 
replaced by majority voting, granting the ECSC's institutions 
power to determine policy and carry out programs. 
The ECSC was Europe's first successful "pilot program" 
for broader European integration. It established the necessary 
institutional structure, invested its institutions with 
real power, created the first "European" civil service, and 
paved the way for the next steps toward economic integration. 
In January 1958,the Treaties of Rome establishing the Common Market 
and The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) came into force and 
extended the integration formula to the whole field of economic activity. 
1. Economic: The very existence of the Marshal! Plan 
was evidence that Western Europe's postwar difficulties 
were more than merely European. Statesmen had learned from pre-
World War II experience that a nation involved in world trade 
cannot be insulated from the economic difficulties of its trading 
partners. Economic depressions were extremely contagious. 
Without assistance, the United States' most important trading 
partner, Western Europe, might have remained on the brink of 
economic disaster for years. A better balance in the world 
economy was advantageous to the United States as well as to 
Western Europe. 
US Aid More 
Than MatChed 
in Trade and 
Investment 
Returns 
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The rapid rise in the standard of living in the 
Community and the diminished barriers to commerce inside 
Europe made it an attractive export market for American consumer 
products and capital goods . The Common Market has had 
an average annual deficit of approximately 1.57 billion units 
of account QJA) in trade with the United States between 1958 and 1972. 
(One UA equals $1.20635 at current rates.) That brings the total 
EC trade deficit with the United States, during those years, to UA 
23.5 billion, exceeding by more than $16 billion total Marshal! Plan 
aid to Common Market countries. (For additional EC-US trade'figures, 
see pages 19, 27, 28, 46.) 
Since 1958, the book value of US direct investment in the 
Community of Six has grown more than eight times, rising from 
$1.9 billion to $15.7 billion in 1972, according to the US 
Department of Commerce. Including direct US investments in 
the United Kingdom and Denmark raises the 1972 figure to $25.6 
billion. US 1973 investments in The Nine totaled $31.3 billion. The 
Community has been one of the most lucrative areas for American 
investment. Between 1960 and 1972, US earnings on investments in the 
Community of Six totaled $9.1 billion. During 1973 alone, US 
investments in the Nine earned $4.8 billion. 
2. Political: Political considerations played an important role 
in the US interest in Europe's well-being. Europe had been the natal 
battle ground for the two most devastating conflicts of the Twentieth 
Century. Pooling the economic and htunan resources of France and 
Germany in an organization open to all European countries would make 
war between the two traditional rivals virtually impossible. Many 
Consistent 
US support 
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US and European statesmen considered it the only way for Europe to 
terminate the internal strife which had twice led the United States to 
intervene on the European scene. 
European political stability was also considered a 
vital part of post-war American defense policy. Following 
the Soviet takeover of Poland and Hungary and the 1948 
~oup d'eta~ in Czechoslovakia, the United States and Western 
Europe felt a common need to resist expansionist pressures from 
the East. The protection of Western Europe, assured through the 
NATO alliance, became America's first line of defense in 
pursuing a policy of "containment" vis a vis the Conmrunist 
world. Although the character of East-West relations has changed 
greatly, the durable nature of the NATO security pact, now the 
oldest military alliance in world history and reaffirmed in 
June 1974 for another 25 years, remains an essential part 
of US- European cooperation. The United States has staunchly 
supported the movement toward the unification of Europe right 
from the beginning. 
May 12, 1950, President Harry S. Truman: ''Mr. Schuman's 
proposal for the pooling of French and German steel and coal 
industries is an act of constructive statesmanship. 
We welcome' it ... This proposal provides the basis for 
establishing an entirely new relationship between France and 
Germany and opens a new outlook for Europe." 
June 25, 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower: "The United 
States supports the Common Market and the concept of increased 
European integration underlying it on political, economi~ 
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and security grounds. The Common Market promises to overcome 
many of the divisive national rivalries that have cost 
Europe so dearly in the past. In promoting internal economic 
strength, the Common Market will also provide a basis for more 
stable governments and for stronger defensive forces in the 
interests of world peace and security." 
July 4, 1962, President John F. Kennedy: 'We do not regard 
a strong and united Europe as a rival but a partner ... 
capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of 
responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, 
of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade 
barriers, resolving problems of commerce and commodities and 
currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic 
and diplomatic areas ... " 
February 25, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon: "The United 
States has always supported the strengthening and enlargement of 
the European Community. We still do. We welcome cohesion in 
Europe because it makes Europe a sturdier pillar of the structure 
of peace." 
August 12, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford: "In promising 
continuity, I cannot promise simplicity. The problems 
and challenges of the world remain complex and difficult . 
I can offer the following: To our allies of a generation, 
in the Atlantic community and Japan,! pledge continuity in 
the loyal collaboration on our many nrutual endeavors ... " 
I 
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I I I c 0 M M u N I I y I N s I I I u I I 0 N s 
AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
I. Institutions: 
The Community is more than a committee or international 
organization. In specific areas such as economic and social 
policy, Community institutions have the power to make decisions 
and execute policies. The major institutions are: 
1) The Commission initiates policy, supervises the execution of 
decisions, and enforces the provisions of the treaties. Though appointed 
unanimously by member government~, the 13 Commissioners are 
required to act with total independence as exponents of the 
Community interest. 
2) The Council of Ministers is composed of a minister from 
each member state and meets regularly to enact laws based upon 
Commission proposals. Daily work and preparations for 
Council meetings are done by the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
and the Council Secretariat. 
3) The European Parliament is made up of 198 members who are 
grouped according to political affiliation and not nationality. 
Like US senators, who were appointed by state legislatures 
I 
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before 1913, members of the European Parliament are appointed 
by member state parliaments. The Seventeenth Amendment to 
the US Constitution changed the election system in the 
United States so that senators were elected directly by the 
people. Similarly, a popular movement is building in Europe 
for direct election of members of the European Parliament, 
samethingforeseen in the three treaties establishing the 
Conununi ty but not yet applied. The powers of the European 
Parliament are limited to consultation on Commission proposals, 
but by 1975 will include partial control of the Community 
budget. The Conunission is answerable to the Parr"iament which can 
dismiss it from office. Plans also call for the creation of upper 
and lower chambers and the enlargement of the Parliament to 426 
members. 
4) The Court of Justice consists of nine judges appointed 
for six-year terms by conunon consent of the national governments. 
As the supreme court of appeal on all Community matters, its 
rulings are binding and not subject to review in national 
courts. The Court is gradually building a tradition of European 
jurisprudence. By 1973, it had handed down over 400 decisions 
of suits brought by the Conunission, national governments, 
and individuals. 
II. Accomplishments: 
Economic: The Community, working through its institutions, 
created a customs union 18 months ahead of schedule, removing 
customs duties and quota restrictions so ~hat goods may move as freely 
among the member countries as they do among the SO US states. 
It has also established a conunon agricultural policy (CAP) which 
includes price supports and Community aid to improve farm 
I 
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efficiency (page 39). The Community has issued and enforced 
"antitrust"regulations to protect free competition and has 
begun to harmonize member state laws in many areas, including 
indirect taxation and product standards. 
Since 1968, a common external tariff has been applied by 
the Community to all goods imported from non-EC countries. 
Tariff reductions carried out under the 1967 Kennedy Round multi-
lateral tariff agreement have made the Community's average 
industrial tariff the lowest in the world. 
The Community has provided more than UA 3.65 billion in 
loans and guarantees for investment projects through its 
European Investment Bank. Under the ECSC Treaty, the steel 
industry has been reorganized and a single market has been 
formed for coal, steel, iron ore, and scrap. Investments in the 
coal and steel industries have been aided by Community loans 
totaling more than UA 1.19 billion by the end of 1973. 
Energy: The enormous increase in oil prices in 1973-74 and 
the Community's heavy dependence on imported oil as an energy 
source have compelled the Commission to devise a new strategy 
for energy policy. This year the Council agreed to move toward a 
common energy policy. 
According to the plan, nuclear energy and natural gas would 
become the Community's major sources of energy by the end of the 
century, reducing the Community's dependence on coal and oil to 
only a fourth of its total energy needs. In the short term, by 
1985, imported energy's share of the Cornmurtity's consumption would 
drop from 63 per cent to between 40 per cent and 50 per cent. At 
the same time measures would be taken to rationalize EC energy 
'· 
Economic and 
Monetary 
Union 
Regional 
Policy 
Underway 
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use and drop the energy consumption level 15 per cent below 
pre-energy crisis forecasts. 
The Community's coordination of member state efforts to develop 
nuclear power for peaceful energy purposes is being carried out by the 
Community's joint nuclear research center and its three branch 
establishments. By February 1974, Euratom had spent over 
$1 billion for nuclear research which has resulted in 1,463 patents 
and 5,000 scientific articles. 
In March 1971, the Community launched a three-stage plan for 
complete economic and monetary union (EMU). The first stage, which 
ended on December 31, 1973, attempted to coordinate member states' 
monetary, credit,and short-term economic policies and to combat 
inflation on a Community level. World monetary disorder and large 
increases in the price of raw materials limited progress, but the 
decision to move on to the second stage was made despite the failure 
to achieve all aims of the first stage. 
At the Paris EC summit meeting, December 9-10, 1974, the nine 
heads of state or government reaffirmed the goal of EMU, resolved to 
work toward a convergence of member state economic policies, and 
called on the Council to draft appropriate guidelines. 
The summitteers also approved creation of the European Regional 
Development Fund to be endowed with nearly $1.6 billion over the next 
three years. The fund will help underwrite projects to stimulate 
development and raise the standard of living in Europe's backward 
or industrially depressed regions. Italy, Britain, and Ireland will 
reap most of the fund's benefits. 
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Progressive Although many people perceive the European Community as an 
Social 
Policy organization created solely to help business and industry, the 
Six set as a primary goal -- as stated in the Common Market Treaty--
"the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of 
their peoples." 
Toward this end, the Community has spent some UA 225 million 
retraining over a half nullion workers in the coal and steel industries 
alone. Through UA 228.5 million in reconversion loans, new jobs 
in new industries have been brought to declining coal and steel 
regions. The Community has also helped finance nearly 138,000 
dwellings for coal and steel workers. The Community's Permanent 
Committee on Mine Safety ensures that the member states adopt new 
safety techniques in the coal industry. 
Through the European Social Fund, the Community has spent 
over UA 562 ndllion promoting the "geographical and occupational 
mobility" of workers in every sector of the economy in the past 
decade. In 1973, the fund's scope was expanded to take account 
of EC enlargement and provide increased financial assistance 
within a Community framework to industries, vulnerable segments 
of the working population (such as migrant and handicapped workers, 
and regions with structural unemployment). The fund's budget has 
quadrupled over the last two years to UA 327.8 million for 1974. 
In 1972, the Community created a standing committee 
on employment, instituted new social security rules for migrant 
workers, established vocational training program guidelines, and 
set up the first comprehensive plan for health care and environmental 
conservation. Proposals are under consideration to protect 
Benefits to 
Consumers 
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workers from mass dismissals by multinational corporations or. 
in the case of mergers, to safeguard the rights of temporary 
employees, and to help improve rehabilitation of the physically 
and mentally handicapped. The Community has consistently worked 
toward ensuring equal opportunities for all. 
Although a common social policy for all the member states 
remains an overall goal, the Community encourages progressive 
social thinking on the national level. Each of the member states 
subsidizes building programs. Each member country gives workers 
incentives to accumulate wealth through wage investment and 
saving plans, profit sharing, and loans. 
Social security expenditures in the Community are among 
the world's highest. Revenue for social security benefits 
comes primarily from employers and provides more benefits than 
the US system. Coverage includes health insurance, family 
benefits, and worker compensation. European workers do not have 
to wait until retirement to cash in on social security benefits. 
Perhaps new consumer benefits since the Community's formation 
offer the best index of the Community's effect on the average 
man. Everyone is a consumer -- whether worker or businessman, 
student or housewife, city-dweller or farmer. Economically, consum-
erism is the one common denominator. 
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Since the Community's inception, European consumers have 
benefited from lower prices and a wider choice of products. Increased 
extra and intra-Community trade and strict enforcement of the 
Community competition policy have helped to raise the standard of 
living. In 1958, the year the EC was born, citizens of the original 
six member countries consumed an average of 2,856 calories per day 
(3,110 in the United States). By 1970, this amount had risen to 
3,224 compared with 3,315 in the United States. Per capita meat 
consumption between 1958 and 1971 rose from 129 pounds to 175 pounds 
per year. Annual US consumption during that period rose from 
191 pounds to 249 pounds per capita. 
In l960, only 78 nersons out of 1,000 owned a 
car. By 1972, 237 people in a thousand owned cars in the Six and 
233 in the Nine. US car ownership rose from 339 per thousand to 448 
per thousand. World car ownership averaged 56 per thousand in 1972. 
Only 6 per cent of the EC population owned television sets in 1960 
compared to 31.5 per cent in the United States. By 1971, more than 
22 per cent of the Community's population owned sets, while in the 
United States, TV ownership had risen to 40 per cent. 
During 1973, the Community initiated a major drive to 
protect consumer interests. An Environment and Consumer Protection 
Service was set up to coordinate, organize and give impetus to 
the Commission's work in this field. A consumers' advisory 
committee of EC consumer organization representatives and experts 
was also established to advise the Commission on forthcoming 
proposals. 
Model for 
World 
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The Council is currently considering a preliminary Community 
consumer information and protection program proposed by the 
Commission. The program calls for EC action to harmonize and 
improve national health and safety standards for a wide range 
of goods, especially foodstuffs and dangerous products; eliminate 
unfair and deceptive advertising and contracts, and supply of 
unsolicited goods; provide legal recourse for the consumer; require 
more complete labeling information, and establish fair pricing 
practices. Community action has already set hygiene standards 
for meat trading; limited animal feedstuff additives; subjected 
dangerous substances, such as hexachlorophene, to stiff packaging 
and labeling laws, and established common automobile safety standards 
for lights, exhaust emissions, brakes, inspections, and noise 
levels, for instance. 
In summary, the Community's linkage of social progress 
with economic growth has become a model for the world. When 
drawing up the adjustment assistance clause of the 1962 Trade 
Expansion Act, for example, US experts referred extensively to 
the Community's successful labor retraining programs and the 
European Social Fund as examples for future US policy. Former 
US Senator Kenneth B. Keating (D-NY) said at the time: "The most 
notable feature of EC trade adjustment since the Common Market 
Treaty took effect January 1, 1958, has been the almost total 
absence of serious adjustment problems for Community labor and 
industry ... " 
Political 
Cooperation 
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Though distinct from the Community institutions and the 
legal commitments that bind member states to the Treaty of Rome, 
political cooperation remains an essential part of the attempt 
to foster European unity. 
At the 1972 Paris "Summit" meeting, the heads of member 
states of the Community decided to strengthen political solidarity by 
promoting closer coordination of their foreign policies. More 
frequent meetings of EC foreign ministers, who now meet at 
least four times a year, and continuing consultation within the 
Political Committee, a group composed of the political directors 
from each foreign ministry, have produced several joint EC 
positions where common foreign policy decisions have been desirable. 
In 1973, the EC member states utilized political cooperation 
to present a common front on the most important issues at the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In June 1974, 
the EC foreign ministers agreed to establish flexible consultation 
procedures with the United States on matters of mutual concern. 
In addition, working parties have been set up within the 
Political Committee to study possibilities of coordinating foreign 
policy among the Nine in the Middle East, the Mediterranean area, 
and Asia. 
EC-US 
Similarities 
10-1-74 16 
I I I. MYTH AND REALITY 
C 0 M M U N I T Y A N D U S T R A D E P 0 L I C Y 
MYTH: UNLIKE 1HE UNITED STATES, 1HE COMMJNITY IS DIFFICULT TO 
NEGOTIATE WI'IH BECAUSE RESPONSIBILITY IN 1HE COr.MJNITY IS DIVIDED 
AMONG ITS INSTITIITIONS, AND MEMBER STATE VETO RIGHTS ARE STRONGLY 
UPHELD. 
REALITY: The situations with respect to the diffusion of governmental 
responsibility are similar in the Community and the United States. 
In certain matters, the Community member states reserve the right to 
reject proposed Community action. In the United States, the 
US Congress has the final say in many matters proposed by the 
Executive Branch. 
1Vhen negotiating commercial policy agreements with third 
countries, the EC Commission conducts negotiations for the nine 
member states. Before negotiations can begin, the Council of 
Ministers must authorize the Commission to open and conduct the 
negotiations on the basis of a mandate approved by the Council. 
This procedure can take time, but the final result 
is a clear mandate agreed to by all member countries. 
During negotiations, the Commission is assisted by a 
special committee appointed by the Council to ensure agreement 
on specific points. Thus, when Community representatives sit 
down at the negotiating table, there is little chance that agreements 
reached will be disapproved by a menilier country. Agreements which 
do not affect the Community treaties, like those on trade, do not 
require ratification by member state parliaments. 
As for economic and industrial cooperation agreements with 
third countries, member states must consult and exchange information 
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with the Commission before signing such accords, according to 
procedures adopted by the Council in 1974. The procedures cover 
both the text of proposed agreements and corresponding member 
state commitments and measures which may affect common EC 
policies. 
The situation in the United States is similar. The US 
Executive Branch receives the approval of Congress to open 
negotiations. Unlike the Council of Ministers, however, Congress often 
reserves the right to give final approval to an agreement negotiated 
by the Executive. For instance, during the Kennedy Round negotiations 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
Congress reserved the right to give final approval on any matter 
affecting the American Selling Price (ASP). (See pages 31-32 
for details on ASP.) (The US representative during the Kennedy 
Round promised that the Administration would work toward Congressional 
removal of ASP.) To reciprocate, US trading partners including 
the Community, granted trade concessions on certain chemical 
products. However, because Congress had not yet rescinded ASP 
by the end of 1972, five years after the conclusion of ~he 
Kennedy Round negotiations, the Community withdrew its offer of 
additional trade concessions which had been dependent on ASP repeal. 
In both the Community and the United States, more than one 
institution or branch of government plays a role in negotiating 
agreements with other countries. The Community approves agreements 
either before or while they are being negotiated. This is also 
true for the United States, except in special cases where agreements 
must ~till be approved after they are negotiated. 
US Trade 
Surplus 
with EC 
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MYTH: "1HERE IS NO REAS<N TODAY WHY TiiE UNITED STATES SHOULD 
INQJR SHOIU-TER-1 EOJK14IC COSTS .•• FOR I.DNG-TER-1 POLITICAL 
ADVANTAGES."* FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS IN rnE GEOPOLITICAL INTEREST 
OF TiiE UNITED STATES TO HAVE A STRONG AND UNITED EUROPE, BUI' NOT 
AT 'lliE fiST OF TRADE AND PAYMENTS DEFICITS. 
REALI'IY: The United States has enjoyed both short-and long-tenn 
econanic gains as a result of European integration. These economic 
benefits include: growing US exports, a consistent US trade 
surplus with the Comm.mity, increasing US foreign investments, and 
an enlarged market for US goods in the African countries associated 
with the Community. 
In 1958, when the Community was formed, US exports to the 
six Common Market member states amounted to $2.4 billion. In 1972, 
US exports to the3ixcame to $8.8 billion, an increase of 266 per 
cent, according to US Commerce Department statistics. During 
the same period, total US exports increased by only 177 per cent, 
again according to the US Government's own figures. 
Between 1958 and 1972 US imports from the Six rose 429 per 
cent from $1.7 billion to $9 billion. Meanwhile, the Community 
has consistently exported less to the United States than it 
has bought from the United States. In 1972, for example, when the 
US trade deficit was $5.9 billion, according to US figures, the 
United States nonetheless ran a $165 million trade surplus with 
the Community. The Community's statistics put the US trade surplus with 
the Six higher, at UA 264 million. Since 1958, the United States has 
* Nathaniel Samuels, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs 
(April 1, 1969, to May 31, 1972) , in an interview in Vision Europe, 
September 27, 1970. 
US Exports 
US Imports 
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nm a consistent trade surplus with the EC averaging some UA 1. 57 
billion a year, according to EC figures. By 1973, following 
EC enlargement to nine member states, US exports to 
the Community had risen to $16.7 billion ($12.6 billion to 
the Six). The United States imported $15.5 billion in EC 
goods that year, running a trade surplus of $1.2 billion, 
according to US figures. 
1973 US Trade Balance with the Communitr 
($ millions) 
Nether- Bri-
EC France Bel-Lux lands Gennanr Italr tain 
16,746 2,263 1,622 2,860 3,756 2,119 3,564 
15,508 1, 715 1,260 923 5,318 1,988 3,642 
+1,238 +548 +362 +1,937 -1,562 +131 -79 
Source: US Department of Commerce 
Den-
mark 
404 
459 
-55 
Ire-
land 
159 
203 
-44 
US Profits 
From EC 
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In the field of investment, the Community has been one of the 
Investments fastest growth areas for American capital. Since 1958, the book 
value of US direct investment in the Six has grown eight-fold, 
rising from $1.9 billion to $15.7 billion in 1972. Investment in 
the Nine during 1973 totaled $31.3 billion. In 1958 investment in the 
Community comprised only 6 per cent of the total American investment 
abroad. By 1973, US investments in the Nine had grown to about 29 
per cent of the total US overseas investment ($107.3 billion). 
US investment abroad has increased employment in the United 
States and is "extremely favorable to the US balance of trade and the 
US balance of payments," according to a study of 125 US manufacturers 
published by t4e Business International Corporation in November 1972. 
"Without foreign investment by US companies, the economic position 
and power of the United States today would be far weaker than it is 
and the number of j ohs in the United States would be much lower," the 
study reported. During 1973, US investments in The Nine earned 
$4.8 billion of which over $2 billion went toward balance of payments 
income. 
More and more US products, from computers to detergents, are 
today produced in Europe and are no longer exported from the United 
States. In 1972, the last year for which figures are available, the 
sales of American manufacturing subsidiaries located in the Community 
of Six amounted to $35.4 billion. This was an increase of $23.9 
billion since 1966. Thus, for 1972, the sales of US manufacturing 
subsidiaries were more than four times the value of total American 
exports to the Community and more than five times the value of 
exports of non agricultural goods. 
Trade With Yaouncie ___ _ 
Countries 
Boosted 
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Although small in comparison with American investment in 
Europe, investment in the United States has become more attractive 
to Europeans as a result of the major changes in currency parities over 
the past few years. Investment by the enlarged Community (except 
Denmark and Ireland) reached $9.9 billion in 1973 ($4.5 billion for 
the Six). British firms account for roughly half the total EC invest 
ment in the United States. Narrowing differences in US and European 
wage costs have also induced German and Dutch companies to 
expand their US investments. 
CCMvtUNITY-US INVESTMENT (BOOK VALUE) 
($ billions) 
EC-Six 
1960 1972 
US investment in the Community 2.6 15.7 
Community investment in 
the United States 1.4 3.9 
EC-Nine 
1973 
31.3 
9.9* 
The Community's high growth rate influences developments in other 
parts of the world, indirectly benefiting the US economy. The 
Community's growth is a powerful stimulant to trade. The fast 
growing Community import market has provided other countries with 
revenues to increase their exports, giving significant benefits 
to US trade. For example, US exports to the 17 African countries and 
Madagascar originally associated with the Community under the 
Yaounde Convention, although traditionally small, grew by 149 per 
cent between 1958 and 1972. During those years, Community exports to 
the Yaounde countries grew by only 104 per cent. EC exports to 
the Yaounde countries greatly exceed US exports, however- In 1972, for 
example, the United States exported $173.3 million in goods while 
* except Ireland and Denmark 
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EC exports totaled $1.7 billion. In 1973 US exports to the Yaounde 
countries totaled $316.6 million, up 277 per cent from 1958. 1973 
EC-Nine exports totaled $2.1 billion. (See pages 50-51 for further 
discussion of the Community and its associates. 
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MY'IH: ''THE EUROPEAN C(M.l)N MARKET IS INCREASINGLY TAKING 
ON 1lffi APPEARANCE OF A NARROW, INWARD- LOOKING PROTECTIONIST 
BLOC WHOSE TRADE POLICIES AS 1lffiY AFFECT ... INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTS INCREASINGLY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST NON-MEMBERS."* 
EC Industrial ~ITY: The Community's average industrial tariff following 
Tariffs Lower 
TI13l1 Those of the completion of the Kennedy Round reductions on January 1, 1972, 
united States 
is 6.0 per cent. This is the lowest average tariff of all the 
principal trading powers. Both the US and the United Kingdom's 
average tariffs on industrial products are higher than 
the Community average. (See page 45 for effect of EC enlargement 
on UK tariffs.) Furthermore, because the Common Market countries 
harmonized their individual tariffs when creating their customs 
union, the Community tariffs are a more uniform height than those 
in other countries. They thereby avoid the "peaks" of many 
other nations' tariff structures which protect certain products. 
AVERAGE POST-KENNEDY ROUND TARIFFS 
(percentages) 
Industrial 
Raw Materials Semi-mfd. Finished mfd. Average 
Community 0.6 6.2 8.7 
United States 3.8 8.3 8.1 
United Kingdom 1.2 8.3 10.4 
Japan 5.5 9.3 12.0 
Source: Tariff Stud'r, GATT, 1971. 
Only 0.4 per cent of Community tariffs, compared to 13.6 per 
cent of US tariffs, are over 20 per cent. 
*Senator Jacob K. Javits, Congressional Record, Vol. 115, No. 187, 
November 13, 1969. 
6.0 
7.1 
7.6 
9.7 
VAT--
An Indirect 
Tax 
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MYTH: lliE C<J.MJNI1Y'S VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) IS A BORDER TAX WHICH 
UNFAIRLY TAXES IMPORTS AND SUBSIDIZES EXPORTS. 
REALI1Y: The VAT is an indirect tax which affects the cost of 
the European consumer's purchase in the same way a US sales 
tax affects US consumption. The VAT is recognized by The GATT as 
a valid fiscal measure which does not interfere with world trade. 
The only essential difference between the VAT and a US sales 
tax is the method of application. The VAT is paid step by step 
at every stage of production, while the US sales tax is paid only 
at the consumer's point of purchase. 
The common feature of these two taxes is their identity 
of purpose, namely taxation of the expenditure of final consumers, 
usually households. Since both taxes apply to domestic consumption, they 
are levied on all commodities, domestic and foreign alike. 
A Frenchman choosing between a US-made shirt and a Community-made 
shirt must pay a tax on either purchase, just as a US citizen 
choosing between a Chevrolet and a Volkswagen pays federal and 
sometimes state sales tax on either purchase. Imports are taxed to 
put foreign and domestic suppliers on an equal footing. 
Since both VAT and US sales taxes apply to domestic consumption, 
exports are exempt from taxation and any indirect taxes nrust be 
refunded. Tax relief on exports is necessary to avoid double 
taxation in countries which also levy an indirect tax on imports. 
Under the value added tax, imports are taxed at the same 
rate as the corresponding domestic product, and exporters are 
rebated the amount of the domestic tax. Since foreign and domestic 
products are treated equally under the VAT system, the VAT cannot be 
considered a protectionist border tax. 
DISC--
A US 
~y 
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The United States, on the other hand, has what amounts 
to a tax subsidy for American exports. The Revenue Act of 1971 
entitles Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC's) to 
a tax deferral on half their earnings. To qualify as a DISC, a 
corporation must do 95 per cent of its business in exports; but 
any business may form a DISC as a "paper" subsidiary through 
which to channel export sales. By the end of 1973, some 3,500 
companies had signed up for DISC status. Domestic cri tics of 
DISC point out that the tax deferral becomes, in reality, a tax 
exemption at an annual loss of up to $1 billion to the US Treasury. 
The Community believes DISC violates Article XVI of 
the GATT. This question is being examined under GATT procedures. 
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MYIH: 1HE EUROPEAN CCM4UNITY' S DISCRIMINATORY TRADING PRACTICES 
AND UNFAIR CCMPETITION HAVE DAMAGED 1HE US TRADE BALANCE AND 
CAUSED 1HE OVERALL US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TO DETERIORATE. 
REALITY: Persistent US balance of payments disequilibria since 
the early Sixties were not caused by deficits on trade 
with the Community. The United States has consistently run 
a surplus on trade with the Community, averaging UA 1.57 billion 
during 1958-72, despite its overall trade deficit since 1971. In 
1973, the US trade surplus with the Nine came to $1.2 billion, 
compared to trade deficits of $2.4 billion with Canada and $1.3 billion 
with Japan, according to US figures. 
The true causes of US balance of payments disequilibria have 
been domestic inflation, low increases in productivity, and 
large capital outflows. Capital export controls, two dollar 
devaluations since 1971, and soaring world prices for agricultural 
goods (which boosted US 1973 farm exports) brought the US balance 
of payments into surplus in 1973. The US balance on current account 
showed a $667 million surplus in 1973, compared to a $9.8 billion deficit 
the year before. 
Skyrocketing petroleum and raw material prices brought on by the 
energy crisis, however, moved the US balance into a $3.7 billion deficit 
through the third quarter of 1974. 
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1973 GENERAL TRADE FIGURES FOR TilE NINE 
(in millions UA) 
Imports Exports 
Intra EC 93.147.1 92,016.1 
World (Extra-EC) 89,506.9 84,561.5 
United States 15,459.9 13,537.9 
AAg.f* 2,464.3 1,794.8 
EFTA** 15,176.2 20,117.0 
Eastern Europe 6,242.2 6 ,672. 2 
*Association of African States, Madagascar, and Mauritius 
**European Free Trade Association 
Balance 
-1,131.0 
-4,945.4 
-1,922.0 
-679.5 
+4,940.7 
+430.0 
27 
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US TRANSACTIONS Willi 1HE EUROPEAN C<»UNI1Y, 1973 
($ millions) 
Inflow Outflow 
Exports of Goods and Services 23,484 
Imports of Goods and Services 25,703 
Net Unilateral Transfers 
(excluding military grants) 91 
Net US Government Capital Flows 63 
Net US Private Capital Flows 4,227 
Net Foreign Capital Flows 13,616 
Net Transactions in US Official 
Reserve Assets 63 
Net Errors and Omissions and 7,204 
Transfers of Funds Between 
Foreign Areas 
(Source: US Department of Commerce "Survey of Current Business" 
June 1974 page SO) 
US Voltm-
tar~and 
Man tory 
Quotas 
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MY1H: lliE UNITED STATES IS 1HE MOST "OPEN MARKET" IN 1HE WORLD. 
UNLIKE MANY OF ITS TRADING PARTNERS, 1HE UNITED STATES HAS NOT 
RESORTED TO 1HE USE OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS TO PROTECT ITS 
INDUSTRIES. 
REALITY: About 18 per cent of US industrial imports are controlled by 
voluntary or mandatory quotas. The 1972 value of industrial 
imports subject to quantitative restrictions was approximately 
$5.4 billion for the United States compared to $0.9 billion for 
the Community of Six. 
From 1963 to March 1973, the number of product categories 
covered by US quantitative restrictions, including quotas and 
"voluntary" limitations rose from seven to 77. 
The Community, on the other hand, has been steadily abolishing 
its quantitative restrictions. Between June 1968 and June 1973, the 
Six nearly halved the number of quotas, from 357 to 183. Although 
these figures are higher than those of the United States, they 
reflect an extensive amount of duplication, since the same products 
may be subject to restrictions in more than one member state. 
Figures are not available for the three new EC members. 
Countervailing 
Duties 
Conflict 
WftllliATI 
Unfair 
Aritidtmrping_ 
Practices 
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The US practice of imposing "countervailing duties" on imports of 
goods allegedly benefiting from a ''bounty" or export subsidy is 
particularly disturbing to Europeans. The US countervailing duty 
statute, unlike countervailing duty practices of other nations, does 
not require a determination of injury to an American industry. This is 
in conflict with GATT rules. The Executive Branch has no flexibility 
in applying countervailing duties, which must be imposed automatically 
whenever imported products are found to be enjoying a subsidy, even if 
the goods are mutually beneficial items of trade which do not harm US 
industry or employment. 
Although there has been a decrease in the Rumber of US complaints that 
the Community is dumping goods on the US market, recent changes in the 
US antidumping regulations cause Europe much anxiety. For example, 
one change allows the Secretary of the Treasury to determine the 
fair value of a product according to any method that seems appropriate, 
in cases where the home market price of an export is difficult to 
determine. Such discretionary leeway, the Community maintains, is 
incompatible with both the GATT and the Geneva Antidumping Code. One 
of the Community's main criticisms of US antidumping practices centers 
on the lack of sufficient investigation of "injury" before acting on 
a complaint and failure to carry on its formal injury investigation 
simultaneously with its investigation to determine the existence of 
dumping. 
Non-Adher-
ence to the 
Brussels 
Tariff Nom-
enclature 
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MYTH: 1HE UNITED STATES HAS FEW IF ANY NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
REALITY: The US system of duty assessment constitutes almost as 
great a barrier to free trade as the uneven level of US tariffs. 
Most of the world, including the Community countries, 
observes the Brussels· Tariff Nomenclature (BTN), an international 
convention establishing a system of classification for virtually 
all goods traded in the world. For countries observing the BTN, 
duties are uniformly assessed on the sum of cost, insurance, and 
freight (cif). 
The United States is one of the few major trading powers 
which does not use the BTN schedule. Instead, it has retained 
a complicated, arbitrary, and variable tariff structure of its 
own. The United States divides imports into three groups. Most 
duties are levied on the free on board (fob) price. Some 500 
product categories, however, pay duty on the basis of their value 
in the American market or their fob value, whichever is higher. This 
US system of duty assessment breeds confusion. 
The American ASP, another nontariff barrier, is the wholesale price of 
Sell1ng 
Price comparable American products, including all expenses and profits, 
determined by the US industry concerned. In practice, the ASP 
system, which violates the GATT, boosts the value on which duties 
are assessed by anything from two to four times the invoice value of thf. 
imported product. This means US producers have an ironclad price 
advantage in dealing with imports. In one field covered by ASP, 
synthetic organic chemicals, sales are made in bulk, and price is the 
decisive element in competition. In the dye field, the United States 
assesses duty on "standards of strength" determined as of July 1, 1914. 
This practice effectively doubles or triples the level of US duty. 
The "Buy 
American" 
Act 
Administrative 
Rhrriers 
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In 1967, during the concl11ding days of the Kennedy Round 
trade negotiations, US representatives promised to work toward 
rescinding ASP in return for reciprocal tariff concessions on 
certain chemical products from the Community, the United Kingdom, 
and other nations. But Congressional approval was required. Congress 
had not rescinded the ASP by December 1972, so the Community, after 
extending the deadline for the package deal several times, finally 
allowed it to expire. (For additional reference to ASP see 
page 17.) 
Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D.-Ark.) and other 
Congressmen have taken the position that the United States, in giving 
away its "only" nontariff barrier, ASP, should ask for further 
concessions from its trading partners over and above the deal struck in 
Geneva in 1967. In other words, the horse should be sold twice. 
The "Buy American" Act requires the national Government to 
purchase American-made products unless domestic products are not 
available or unless the domestic product is over 6 per cent more 
expensive. The Pentagon applies a SO per cent price differential 
and also maintains a long list of products including food and 
clothing which cannot be purchased abroad at any price. Other 
countries, including those in the European Community, practice 
"administrative discretion" in their public purchases. In the 
United States, this is done particularly at the state and local 
levels. 
A wide variety of administrative controls also impedes or 
complicates Community exports to the United States. No foreign 
vessel, for example, can engage in shipping between two ports along 
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the US coast. ''Marks of Origin" require labeling of imports 
such as ''Made in Italy" or ''Made in Japan" which adds to production 
costs and can result in discrimination against foreign-made goods. 
Increased 
Conmrunity 
Imports of 
Japanese 
ProdUcts 
Competi-
tion 
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MYTH: RAPIDLY RISING JAPANESE EXPORTS TO THE US MARKET ARE DUE TO 
<DMJNITY PROTECTIONISM AGAINST JAPANESE PRODUCTS. 
REALITY: Since 1958, Japan's exports to the Conmrunity have jumped 
from UA 117 million to UA 1.9 billion in 1972. During the 
same period Japanese imports of Conmrunity products rose from 
UA 139 million to UA 1.1 billion. In 1973, The Nine imported $3 .. 6 
billion in Japanese goods while exporting $2.4 billion to that country. 
Japan does not have as extensive trade with the Community as it does in 
the United States. In 1972, 31.1 per cent of Japanese exports went to 
the United States, and only 7. 7 per cent to the Corrnnon Market. The 
difference is due to stiff competition in the European market and to 
natural barriers, not trade barriers. 
Japanese firms and Conmrunity firms both concentrate in 
many of the same industries and produce many of the same products, 
such as consumer electronics, small automobiles, and textiles. 
As a result, Japanese exports find stiff competition in the 
European market. In addition, delivery time and service after 
sale give European products the competitive edge. For example, of 
the Community members only Italy limits the entry of Japanese 
automobile imports. Yet, in 1972, the Conmrunity of Six imported 
$147 million in cars as compared to more than $1.1 billion in cars 
imported by the United States. 
Natural The natural barrier of distance also limits Japanese exports to 
Barr1ers 
Europe. One ocean separates the American market from Japan; two 
oceans separate the European market from Japan. The additional 
transportation costs make the European market less attractive to Japan. 
EC - Jal?an 
Conunerc1al 
Trea!l_ 
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While import controls and higher oil costs have sharply 
reduced Japan's overall trade surplus, its trade surplus with 
the Conmrunity has continued to grow. Japanese trade with the 
Conmrunity registered its first surplus in 1965 at UA 112 million. 
By 1972, the surplus had reached UA 796 million, according to 
EC statistics. Japan had a $1.2 billion surplus with the Nine in 
1973 -- bringing in $3.2 billion in EC goods and exporting $4.4 
billion to the Community. 
Some EC member states still impose a few quantitative 
restrictions against Japanese products, similar to those of the 
United States. There are no EC restrictions, although the Community 
is monitoring the heavy influx of electronic calculator imports mainly 
from Japan which may have strained EC producer's competitive ability. 
The Commission is trying to improve trade equilibrium by increasing 
European exports to Japan rather than cutting back imports. Toward 
this end, the Community is negotiating its first commercial treaty 
with Japan to replace national treaties. The negotiations have been 
held up pending the conclusion of the Tokyo round of GATT 
negotiations. 
This fall the Community opened a delegation in Tokyo. 
Generalized 
Preferences 
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MY1H: 'IHE EUROPEAN cn.MJNITY IS A RICH MAN'S CLUB. ITS TARIFFS 
ARE PARTiaJLARLY HARMFUL TO EXPORTS FRCM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
REALITY: On July 1, 1971, the European Conununity became the first 
trading power to extend generalized tariff preferences to developing 
countries' manufactured and sernifinished exports and some processed 
foods. The one-way preferences eliminated some or all import , duties 
for specific products without requiring tariff concessions for 
Community products in the developing world. The 96 developing 
countries which make up the so-called "Group of 77" of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) initially 
benefited from the preferences. Now, 110 developing countries 
and 4:3 dependencies are eligible for EC preferences. 
The Coimnon Market has continuously supported UNCTAD in 
seeking generalized preferences and has fought hard to get other 
developed countries, particularly the United States, to agree 
to preferential treatment for developing countries. Special treatment 
was necessary to counterbalance the rich countries' trade benefits 
resulting from the GATI' tariff cuts, the Conununi ty argued. Canada 
instituted a preference system in 1974. The United States, which 
has not yet extended generalized preferences, opposed the 
Conmnn1ity's proposals on the grounds that the Community planned to 
conti11ue to apply specific preferences to African and European 
countries already associated with it. The United States also 
objected because many agricultural products were excluded while 
certain industrial products the United States wanted to exclude 
were not. Agreement was finally reached in the Organization for 
Econcmric Cooperation and Development (OECD) permitting the developed 
countries to submit their own plans. It allows some countries to 
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exclude certain types of products from the developing world. 
The American plan, incorporated in the proposed Trade Reform 
Act, ·would extend preferences to products designated by the 
President. It would exclude any product subject to US import 
relief measures or whose imports exceed $25 million or 50 per 
cent of total US imports of that article. Eligible articles 
must be imported directly from the developing countries and the 
value added must be at least a minimum percentage of the value 
of the article (between 35 per cent and 50 per cent). 
The developing countries were particularly eager for industrial 
products to be included in generalized preferences. Through 
new investment and liberalized exports of industrial goods, 
developing countries can be sure of benefiting directly from 
generalized preferences. The main reason is that world demand is 
more elastic for manufactured goods as regards both price and 
quantity than for raw materials or agricultural products. Generalized 
preferences will lead to the establishment of factories to process 
raw materials on the spot, leading to industrialization of developing 
countries and improvement of their terms of trade. 
The Community's generalized preference system has set up quotas 
on specific imports from developing countries to protect the 
Community industries. The ceilings are fixed each year by product 
and country of origin. In the case of products like textiles, where 
the developing countries are highly competitive, the ceilings are 
pegged 5 per cent above the previous year's total exports. For sensitive 
industrial products in general, the Commission has proposed reducing the 
list of protected items from 51 in 1974 to seven in 1975. (See pages 50-57) 
for further discussion of Community relations with developing nations.) 
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For non-sensitive products, the ceilings are almost totally 
non-restrictive. The industrial products ceiling rose from 
UA 340 million in 1971 for the Six to UA 900 million 
in 1973. In 1974, the first year the three new 
'38 
members applied the system, the ceiling was set at pA 2 billion. 
The textile ceiling rose from 19.4 thousand tons for the second 
half of 1971 to 42.6 thousand tons in 1973. The 1974 ceiling for the Nine 
was 68.2 thousand tons or about UA 500 million. Between 1971 and 
1974, the number of processed agricultural product categories 
rose trom 147 to 187, raising the potential trade impact from 
UA 45 million to UA 450 million. In December 1973, the Community 
added flue-cured Virginia-type tobacco to the preference list, 
the first time a basic agricultural product had been included. 
Despite the threat of recession, the Community plans to maintain 
and expand its generalized preference system. The Commission has 
drafted a plan to revise the ceiling calculation system and raise 
the 1975 agricultural ceiling to UA 650 million and the industrial 
product ceiling to UA 2.3 billion. The Commtm.ity's annual capacity for 
imports from developing countries is estimated at about UA 25 billion. 
Since the eligible countries have not taken full advantage of the 
EC preference system, (only 42 per cent of the industrial goods 
ceiling was met in 1972) the Community will introduce a "reserve 
proportion" into the quotas in 1975. Individual countries' tm.used 
quotas could then be transferred into the reserve and made available 
to other countries. 
Top Market 
for US Fann 
GoodS 
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HY'IH: THE CCMDN AGRICUL1URAL POLICY (CAP) DAMAGES THE INTERESTS OF 
THE US FARMER WHO SEES HIS EXPORTS TO EUROPE INCREASINGLY DIMINISHED 
BY CAP'S TARIFFS ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. 
REALITY: American agricultural exports to tne Community have 
consistently increased since the introduction of the common agricultural 
policy (CAP). In 1964, the last full trade year prior to the 
beginning of the CAP, American agricultural exports to the Six 
amounted to $1.4 billion. By the end of 1972, they had risen 
to a record $2.1 billion annually, according to US Department 
of Commerce statistics. Exports to The Nine in 1973 came to $4.5 
billion. This $4.5 billion figure accounted for over a quarter of the 
$17.7 billion in total US fann exports during that year. 
Viewed another way, the CAP has apparently had little adverse 
effect on US fann exports. Between 1964 and 1972, American agricultural 
exports to the Community have increased 49 per cent. Between 1971 and 
1972 alone, US fann exports to the Community rose 15.4 per cent, while 
total US exports to the Community increased only 4.8 per cent, 
according to the US Department of Commerce. 
American agricultural exports to the fonner nine-nation European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA)~which had no common agricultural 
policy, grew more slowly and declined relative to total fann exports. 
In 1958,US fann exports to EFTA amounted to $585 million; in 1972, $890 
million, according to US statistics. As a percentage of total US 
fann exports, however, they declined from 15.2 per cent in 1958 to 9.~: 
per cent in 1972. 
*Britain, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, .Austria, 
Switzerland and Portugal. 
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In contrast, Community agricultural exports to the United 
States are smaller than imports from the United States. In 1958, 
the Community exported $205 million in farm products to the United States. 
By 1972, EC-Six farm exports had risen to $531 million. The Community 
thus had an agricultural trade deficit of $1.58 billion with the 
United States, according to US Statistics. In 1973, the Nine's 
farm exports to the United States totaled $1.12 billion or 13.2 
per cent of total US farm imports. 
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MYTII: TIIE CCJ.MJNITY' S SYSTEM OF AGRICUL1URAL SUPPORT IS MJRE 
DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST FOREIGN FARM GOODS 1HAN TIIE US SUPPORT 
SYSTEM. 
REALITY: All major industrial countries support the incomes of 
agricultural workers. Governments seek to integrate agricultural 
workers into an industrial society and give them an adequate income. 
In the Conuntmity, where 9 per cent of the working population 
is employed in agriculture(over 50 per cent in certain regions of 
southern Italy), the political pressure for farm support is very 
great. Agriculture employs only 4 per cent of the US labor force. 
The lag in efficiency of the Community's agricultural economy poses 
social and political problems for Europe of such magnitude that they 
can be solved only by gradual reform of the basic farm economy structure. 
There are no short-term solutions. 
Comparing The CAP is based on a price support system including a variable 
Farm Support 
~Ystems levy or import duty on foreign goods. Most CAP products are quota 
free. The US system is an income support method combined with 
quantitative import restrictions. Therefore, while the farmer is 
protected tmder both systems, with few temporary exceptions, imports 
are not limited in the Community as they are in the United States. 
Although the Conununity was forced to impose a temporary embargo on beef 
imports when faced with excess production and limited storage capacity, 
it also instituted a program of delaying slaughter to remedy the situation. 
Reduced 
Community 
Tariff for 
Oranges 
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The Community has also made allowance for certain US farm 
imports which may have been affected through EC trade arrangements 
with other countries orthroughenlargement. (see page 47). For instance 
in February 1972, the Conmamity decreased its tariffs on citrus 
fruits from 8 per cent to 5 per cent from June through September 
to meet US objections to EC preferential arrangements with Morocco, 
Tunisia, Israel, Spain, and Turkey. The summer months are the 
peak season for US oranges, while the Mediterranean orange season occurs 
in the winter. 
Following the GATT Article XXIV-6 renegotiations in connection 
with EC enlargement which were successfully concluded with the United 
States, among others, the Community tariff on fresh sweet oranges has 
been reduced even further and the period of application has been extended. 
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HYTII: THE COMMUNITY'S FARM POLICY IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY 
PROTECTIONIST AND WILL SERVE AS A STUMBLING BLOCK DURING THE 
UPffiMING GATT NEGOTIATIONS. 
REALITY: On the contrary, the Conummi ty stands corrmi tted to 
working for free world trade in agricultural products. Every 
country maintains a certain degree of protectionism in the interest 
of it's farmers' welfare. However, the onslaught of inflation and 
problems of over-production of some products (beef), and shortages 
of others (sugar, grains, and soybeans) threaten to disrupt the 
orderly flow of trade and reverse the trend toward liberalization. 
The Conummity is attempting to reform its own agricultural policy 
to restore a balance to consumption and production and to avoid 
protectionism. It is also working internationally to restabilize and 
liberalize farm trade. Corrmission officials maintain regular contacts 
with the Community's major trading partners, such as the United 
States, Japan,and Canada, to ensure the continued orderly exchange 
of goods. It is also negotiating new trade agreements with the 
developing and Mediterranean countries. 
In addition to working through international forums such as the 
United Nations World Food Conference, the Community will participate in 
the GATT negotiations whose success it sees as a vehicle for further 
reducing trade barriers and for achieving a new economic equilibrium 
throughout the world. In the words of EC Commission Vice President in 
charge of external relations, Christopher Soames: "It is not by 
a theoretical argument as to whether such and such an agricultural 
policy is more or less protectionist than the next one that we are 
• 
going to get places, rather it is by seeking common reciprocal 
international solutions to the problems that have beset agricultural 
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trade in recent years that we shall make progress."* 
* Address to the Australian National Press Club, Canberra, 
September 6, 1974 
44 
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B R I T I S H E N T R Y --
I S I T A B 0 0 N 0 R A B U S T F 0 R U S E X P 0 R T E R S ? 
MYTH: 1HE UNITED STATES HAS LITTLE TO GAIN AND MUCH TO LOSE 
FRa.f EC ENLARGEMENT. 
Enlarged REALITY: With the accession to the Treaty of Rome by Britain, 
Market 
AdVantages Ireland, and Denmark, the Conmnmity became a single trading group 
UK May Have 
Liberalizing 
Effect 
of 253 million people. By July 1, 1977, it will become a single 
market with one set of tariffs and harmonized regulations. American 
firms are accustomed and equipped to tackle such a market. They 
have the funds and the organization to sell successfully in that 
market, assets that European companies are only beginning to match. 
The United States can gain much from British entry. In 
addition to the possibility that the United Kingdom may have a 
liberalizing effect on Common Market policy, the United States can 
take advantage of an enlarged market for its exports and investments. 
Both Britain and the Conmnmity depend more heavily on foreign 
trade than does the United States and thus have a greater economic 
interest in liberal world trade. In 1973, US export earnings (goods 
and services) accounted for 7.7 per cent of its GNP; Conmnmity exports 
accounted for about 20.3 ner cent. 
MOreover, the United Kingdom's tariffs on industrial goods will 
be gradually lowered to conform to the Conmnmity's common external 
tariff. Before entry, the United Kingdom's average tariff on industrial 
goods was 7.6 per cent, compared to the Conmnmity's 6 per cent tariff. 
(for post-Kennedy Round comparisons of tariffs on industrial goods, 
see page 23 ) • 
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11IE ENLARGED Ca.MJNITI -- A NEW PROFILE -- 1973 
Area (thousand sq. miles) 
Population ($ millions) 
Gross National Product ($ billions) 
Exports ($ billions) 
Imports ($ billions) 
Percentage of world exports* 
Percentage of world imports* 
Conmrunity 
of Six 
449 
192.5 
843.2 
86.1 
81.3 
16.6 
15.4 
Conmrunity 
of Nine 
589 
256 .. 6 
1,1)83.7 
102.1 
108.0 
19. 7 
20.4 
Source: EC Statistical Office - 1973 figures 
*Based on International MOnetary Fund 1974 figures. 
US TRADE WITII 11IE C(}.MJNITI -- 197 3* 
US Exports ($ billions) 
As a percentage of total 
US exports 
US Imports ($ billions) 
As a percentage of total US 
imports 
us TRADE WITII 11IE I ''IBREE' '* 
($ millions) 
US Imports 
Britain 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Total 
US Exports 
Conmrunity 
of Six 
12.6 
17.7 
11.2 
16.2 
1972 
2,987.1 
366.9 
151.9 
3,505.9 
Britain 2,658.2 
Denmark 257.7 
Ireland 125.0 
Total 3,040.9 
*Source: US Department of Conmerce 
Conmunity 
of Nine 
1973 
3,642.1 
458.5 
202.5 
4,303.1 
3,563.5 
403.6 
158.9 
4,126.0 
16.7 
23.5 
15.5 
22.4 
Per Cent 
Increase 
22 
25 
33 
23 
34 
57 
27 
36 
• 
Liberaliziefp 
Effect on 
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~: 1HE ENLARGEMENT OF 1HE CCM.1UNI1Y WILL arr OFF ONE OF 1HE 
BEST MARKETS FOR US FARM PRODUCTS -- BRITAIN. 
REALITY: A1 though import duties and agricultural levies did go 
up on certain US industrial and agricultural products in the three 
new members when they joined the Conmnmi ty, a US- EC agreement on 
a formula for reducing certain of those duties was reached in 
mid-1974. Products covered in the agreement include: unmanufactured 
tobacco (the second most important US farm export to Britain), 
oranges, grapefruit, raisins, liver, salmon, plywood, photographic 
film, certain types of paper, tractors, engines, pumps, and measuring 
instruments. These US exports are worth nearly a billion dollars 
annually. The accord was reached through negotiations under 
the GATT's Article XXIV-6. Negotiations are underway concerning 
certain types of grains. Grains are the top US farm export to 
Britain ($165.7 million in 1973). 
The interests of the Three as food importers coincides with US export 
interests. As Common Market market members, they will work to 
hasten the reform of the Conmnmity's agricultural sector, including 
a lowering of the CAP support prices. As the farm population in 
the Community countries continues to shrink over the next decade, it 
will become politically possible for the Community to liberalize the 
CAP. British, Irish, and Danish participation in the Community could 
tip the balance toward a liberalization of tariff barriers that might 
not have been politically feasible without it. 
Efta Free 
Trade 
Retained 
US ~orts 
to r'A 
Minimal 
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MYTH: THE AGREEMENTS WITII THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE 
ASSOCIATION THAT DECIDED NOT TO JOIN THE COMMUNITY THREATEN US 
TRADE INI'ERESTS. 
REALITY: The European Community has negotiated agreements with 
all European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members (Iceland, 
Sweden, Finland,. Portugal, Switzerland, Norway, and Austria) to 
prevent the growth of new trade barriers to Intra-European trade. These 
agreements conform to the GATT rules concerning free trade areas. 
Free trade in manufactured goods within EFTA -- that is, between the 
new Community members (Britain and Denmark) and the remaining members 
had been achieved. Without new agreements, enlargement would have 
curtailed the existing free trade between these nine countries. 
The United States' total exports to the remaining EFTA countries 
grew nearly 30 per cent, from $1.8 billion to $2.3 billion, between 
1972 and 1973. 
US EXPORTS TO EFTA NON-CANDIDATE COUNTRIES -- 1973 
($ millions) 
Austria 118.3 
Finland 132.6 
Iceland 25.9 
Portugal 232.2 
Sweden 541.6 
Switzerland 959.8 
Norway 296.8 
Total 2,306.6 
Source: US Conunerce Department 
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In no case did the US share of these countries' total 
imports exceed 10 per cent. The United States can hardly claim 
that these agre~ents will create a new pattern of trade with 
these countries or that it will be hurt since such trade is 
insignificant. 
The new EC-EFTA agreements are subject to the review and 
approval of the GATT whose more than 80 members, including the 
United States, have a voice. 
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THE COMMUNITY AND THE WORLD 
MYTH: "THE UNITED STATES HAS GWBAL INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 
OOR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE REGIONAL INTERESTS."* 
REALITY: Since the Community began, it has given close attention 
to relations with developing countries especially those linked 
by tradition to its members. The EC Treaty provided for the 
economic interests of Belgian, French, Italian, and Dutch overseas 
territories and dependencies, mainly in Africa and the Carribean. 
These provisions still apply to overseas territories. Had special 
relations been terminated, these new African nations would have 
faced economic ruin. These nations sent more than half their 
exports to the Community countries before the Common Market's 
creation. 
Accepting a political responsibility, the Community granted 
association, at their request, to: Burundi, Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, the Peoples' Republic of the Congo, 
Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire, and as 
of January 1, 1973, Mauritius. This association, governed by 
the Yaounde Convention, has resulted in an industrial free trade 
area as sanctioned by Article XXIV of the GATT. (For information 
on aid to these African states and Madagascar, see page 21; for 
more information on trade, see pages 27, 36-38.) 
* US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger addressing the Annual Meeting 
of the Associated Press Editors at New York, NY, April 23, 1973. 
Ties With 
Underdevelohed 
Connnonweal t 
Countries 
10-1-74 51 
Other Community associates are: Greece, Turkey, the East 
African Community (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania), Tunisia, Morocco, 
Malta, and Cyprus. The current and second five-year ''Yaounde 
Convention" went into force on January 1, 1971. 
On joining the Community, Britain agreed to phase out 
Commonwealth tariff preferences. As a result, underdeveloped 
Commonwealth countries in Africa and in the Indian, Caribbean, 
and Pacific Oceans were invited to seek preferential trade ties 
with the Community. The Nine and the 47 "associables" (ACP countries) 
including the Yaounde associates and the East African Community nations 
have been negotiating a new five year treaty of association scheduled 
to go into effect on February 1, 1975. The new pact will supersede the 
two previous Yaounde conventions and the Arusha Convention signed by 
the Community and the East African Community. 
During the EC-ACP ministerial meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, in 
July 1974, the Community agreed to stabilize ACP export commodity 
earnings by compensating for any drop in world prices below 
agreed reference prices. It also abandoned efforts to secure 
"reverse preferences" for EC exports on ACP markets. This 
step seems sure to silence US complaints. 
Historic 
Ties----
Future 
Membership 
~1 
Treatment 
§_quilibrium 
Mafntained 
Redefini.ng_ 
Relation~ 
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MYTH: 1HE COMMUNITY'S PREFERENTIAL AND NON- PREFERENTIAL C<l+ffiRCIAL 
ARRANGEMENTS WITH MEDITERRANEAN, AFRICAN, AND ASIAN COUNI'RIES 
DJM)NSTRATE 1HE CCM10N MARKET'S CCJ.MERCIAL EXPANSIONI1:M. 
REALITY: Certain countries do have special trade relations with 
the Community. However, these trade relations were in every case 
initiated by the third country concerned and cannot be considered 
economic expansionism on the part of the Common Market. 
Four principal reasons led the Community to respond to their 
requests: 
- In the case of Tunisia and Morocco, association agreements 
were necessary to extend the special economic links which existed 
between these countries and France to the entire Community. 
- In the case of Greece and Turkey, the agreements are designed 
to enable these countries to participate as full members in the 
European Community when their economies are sufficiently developed. 
Recently a new step in this direction was taken with Turkey (as 
with Greece) when that country accepted a schedule for gradually 
establishing a customs union with the Community. 
- In the case of the three East African states--Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania--the Community accepted requests for special trade relations 
for the sake of equity. The economies of these three countries are 
comparable to the economies of other developing African countries 
associated with the Common Market. 
- In the case of Spain, Israel, Malta, and Egypt, special trade 
arrangements are regarded by the Community as essential to maintain 
economic and commercial equilibrium among nations in the Mediterranean 
Basin. 
The Community has opened negotiations to redefine its relations 
with the Mediterranean basin countries. 
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Non- Non-preferential agreements are non-discriminatory as the 
P'Te"ferential 
Agreements preferences extended are given to all GATT members. The 
Community has non-preferential trade agreements with Yugoslavia, 
Brazil, India, Argentina, and Uruguay. The EC- Indian accord is 
also a commercial cooperation agreement. Similar agreements 
are being negotiated with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. 
Negotiations have begun with Iran to replace a non-preferential 
. agreement which expired on December 1, 1973. 
Exploratory talks have also begun to explore the possibility of 
negotiating some sort of trade agreement with Canada and Mexico. 
Conmnmity 
Gives Pro-
portionally 
More Aid 
Common 
Development 
Policy 
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MYTI-1: TI-lE EUROPEAN Ca.MJNITY DOES NOT I 'SHARE 1HE BURDEN' I 
IN AIDING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
REALITY: US development assistance is greater in absolute terms than 
Community aid, but every Community member country contributes a higher 
percentage of gross national product (GNP) to the "Third World" than 
does the United States (see table, page 55). (US GNP is 41 per cent 
more than the combined GNP of the Nine.) According to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), development aid as a 
percentage of GNP is the only valid comparison. 
In 1973, according to OECD figures, the United States contributed 
.64 per cent of its GNP to developing countries. The Community member 
countries, on the other hand, contributed as follows: Belgium 1.10 
per cent; France, 1.10 per cent; Germany, .51 per cent; Italy, .46 
per cent; the Netherlands, 1.03 per cent; Denmark, .70 per cent; United 
Kingdom, .61 per cent. (All percentages include both government aid 
and grants by private voluntary agencies; figures for Luxembourg and 
Ireland, which do not belong to the OECD's Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) are unavailable. 
Thus, the Community comes closer than the United States to the 
DAC's goal of 1 per cent of GNP for aid to the Third World, and 
three countries -- Holland, France, and Belgium -- have surpassed it. 
DAC figures include aid channeled by member states through 
Community institutions, as well as their bilateral aid programs. The 
Community created the European Development Fund (EDF) in 1958 to 
aid its members' overseas territories' social and economic development. 
The first EDF paid out $581 million. After many of these 
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territories had achieved independence and the 5ignature of the 
Yaounde Convention, the second EDF was formed. It was endowed 
with $800 million to spend over five years. The third EDF has 
$1.2 billion to spend over the same period. Nearly all EDF 
aid to the Yaounde associates is given in the form of outright 
grants. 
Between 1958 and 1972, the Community also made available 
UA 142.3 million for loans to the Yaounde countries through 
the European Investment Bank (see page 9.) 
Following is a breakdown of foreign aid, official and 
private, in 1973. 
Private Aid Total Aid 
C$ Millions) ($ Millions) 
Belgitnn 268.0 506.8 
Britain 414.4 1,058.2 
Denmark 63.4 195.0 
France 1,234.3 2,800.1 
Germany 458.8 1,790.0 
Ireland* NA NA 
Italy 109.2 645.0 
Luxembourg* NA NA 
Netherlands 275.2 612.1 
EC total* 2,823.3 7,607.2 
United States 4 '901. 0 8,346.0 
Japan 3,654.3 5,844.2 
Source: OECD Development and Cooperation Review 1974. 
Percent 
of GNP 
1.10 
.61 
.70 
1.10 
. 51 
.46 
1.03 
.73 
.64 
1.42 
*OECD statistics are unavailable for Ireland and Luxembourg, which 
are not DAC members. 
EC Food 
Aid Program 
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To alleviate hunger in famine or disaster stricken countries, 
the Community has given food aid since 1968. After the Kennedy 
Round of GATT negotiations, the Six agreed to supply 1,035,000 
metric tons of grain a year as part of the 1967 International Food 
Aid Convention. In 1973-74, the Nine will supply 1,287,000 tons 
of grain. Without any international commitment, the Community 
also contributes powdered skim milk, butteroil, sugar, and powdered 
eggs to needy countries. The products donated are sold on the 
recipient country's local market with the resulting collateral 
funds used for financing development projects. 
The Community also sets up emergency food aid operations to 
help disaster stricken countries. In 1973 alone, such operations 
involved delivery of 313,000 tons of cereals and 16,000 tons of 
skimmed milk powder to such countries as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Pakistan, and the Sahel countries. 
Aid for the Since the EDF was set up, the Sahel countries ~uritania, 
Sahel Reg1on 
Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad), have received UA 128 
million for improving irrigation and stock breeding. When the 
peoples in the Sahel were hit by the prolonged drought, an EC 
emergency aid program was launched which by the end of 1973 had 
provided UA 60 million in cereals and milk supplies. UA 40 million 
in emergency financial aid has thus far been budgeted for the Sahel 
and Ethiopia in 1974. 
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MYTH: TilE EUROPEAN C()MJNITY HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON 
EAST-WEST DETENTE. 
57 
Increased REALITY: On the contrary, by expanding trade with east European 
Trade 
EC Tariff 
Concessions 
countries, the Common Market has been a harbinger of East-West 
detente. Brussels officials compare this trade trend with the 
effect of fonner President Richard M. Nixon's Moscow trip and West 
Gennan President Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. Between 1958 and 
197~trade between the Nine and the East European countries of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon) grew from $1.9 billion 
to $9.7 billion. EC imports from those countries grew from $1.1 
billion to $4.7 billion. EC trade with Comecon countries grew faster 
than trade with external countriP.~ ~s a whole. 
Beginning in December 1969, the Community established a policy 
of liberalizing quotas on products of special interest to East 
European countries . Romania, whose trade with the Community 
amounts to almost SO per cent of its total trade outside the Eastern 
Bloc, has been included in the Community's generalized preference 
plan since January 1, 1974--the first official request from a 
Comecon country to a European Community institution. 
The Soviet Union, though recognizing the Community as "a fact 
of life," has preferred to deal bilaterally with Community countriec;;. 
After January 1, 1973, however, the EC Council of Ministers has 
decided that trade negotiations with East European countries will 
be conducted by the Community, instead of by its individual member 
countries. After that date, the conclusion of bilateral agreements 
between individual Common Market countries and Comecon states will 
no longer be permitted. Most trade agreements between the Community 
and East European countries will expire at the end of 1974. Then 
Background 
f'or Detente 
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the Comnn.mi ty will indeed be a "fact of life" for the East. 
There has already been a noticeable change in the state 
trading countries' attitude toward the Comnn.mity. On December 21, 1972, 
Soviet Comnn.mist Party Secretary Leonid I.Brezhnev said it was 
possible "to discover the elements of certain forms of relationship 
between the Common Market and Comecon . . . provided the countries 
of the Common Market abstain from any attempt at discrimination 
against the other party and permit the development of authentic 
bilateral links and pan-European cooperation." 
Prospects for official Comecon-EC relations improved August 27,1973, 
when Comecon secretary Nicolai Fedeyev put forward the idea of 
negotiations to the President of the Council of Ministers, in 
Copenhagen. The Council replied, through the Danish Ambassador to 
Moscow that if Comecon wanted to approach the Community the appropriate 
body to deal with was the Commission._ This year, Commission 
President Francois-Xavier Ortoli was invited by Fedeyev to meet 
with him in Moscow. The invitation is under study by the Conununity. 
Besides this functional approach through trade to a "generation 
of peace," the European Conununity's very existence has provided the 
necessary background for East-West detente. Without the Community, 
Western Europe today might have been this century's third world 
battleground instead of a source of political and economic 
stability. 
Improved China 'already has strong commercial ties with the Community 
Relations 
With China and its growing interest in and increased contact with EC and 
national officials raises the possibility of official Chinese 
recognition of the Community. The EC-Nine officially recognize 
China--Denmark was first in 1950; Ireland last, in 1972. 
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China welcomed the Conmrunity' s enlargement in 1973. During 
the late French President Georges Pampidou's visit to Peking, 
in September 1973, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai told him, "We •.. 
support the peoples of Europe in uniting themselves to support 
their sovereignty and independence." He added: "The cause of 
European unity, if it is carried out well, will contribute to the 
improvement of the situation and the whole world." 
The Community is China's second largest trading partner after 
Japan. For the first time in many years, the 1972 EC trade 
balance showed a UA SO million deficit in favor of China that year. 
In 1958, the EC had a UA 197.7 million trade surplus with China. 
EC-China trade rose 54 per cent between 1958 and 1972, from UA 409.7 
million to UA 630 million. Trade with the Nine rose from UA 546.7 
million to UA 811 million during that period. Chinese exports to the 
Six rose 212 per cent from UA 106.7 million to UA 333 million. That 
country's imports from the Six, on the other hand, showed a slight 
drop from UA 303 million to UA 297 million during those years. 
Sharing 
·nefense 
Burdens 
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MYTH: SINCE WORLD WAR I I , EUROPE HAS PROSPERED AT niE EXPENSE 
OF lliE AVERAGE AMERICAN TAXPAYER WHO PAYS niE BILL FOR EUROPE'S 
DEFENSE. 
REALITY: The United States maintains a military presence in Western 
Europe of more than 300,000 defense and defense-related personnel. 
The US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
accotmts for about $17 bi.llion or about 22 per cent of the Defense 
Department's annual budget, but this figure includes the costs 
of all forces pledged to NATO in case of emergency, including 
some troops stationed in the United States and in other non-European 
parts of the world. Furthermore, this myth overlooks the basic 
reality: that the US military commitment to Europe does as much for 
Atlantic security as for European security. 
MOreover, Europe's contribution to Atlantic security is steadily 
increasing. EC defense expenditures between 1972 and 1973 rose 
from $31.2 billion to $40.4 billion. (Figures for Ireland are 
not available.) 
European forces (including Greece and Turkey) now comprise about 
90 per cent of the ground troops, 93 per cent of the sea power, and 
93 per cent of the air power of NATO forces in Europe. While the 
operating costs of maintaining US forces in Europe amotmt to about 
$ 7J billion, the EC cotmtries in NATO (except Ireland and France) 
spend more than $30.2 billion annually on NA~ "America's first line 
of defense." 
The burden borne by Europeans for their own defense is put into 
perspective when viewed in terms of their gross national product (GNP). 
While the United States spends 6.7 per cent of GNP on defense 
worldwide, but only about 1.3.per cent of GNP on defense of Europe, 
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the Europeans spend about 4.5 per cent of GNP on defense, nearly 
all of it on defending Europe. Europe is indeed sharing the 
defense burden. 
The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe thus evaluated 
the European defense effort: "On most balanced measures of the 
l~estern defense effort, the NATO European countries seem to be 
providing a reasonable share of the collective defense. The burden 
of proof does seem to be on assertions to the contrary."* 
The European Community, of course, is not directly involved 
with NATO. However, as the Community's political cohesion grows, 
common defense and foreign policies become foreseeable, indeed 
desirable. Until the day when a common European defense policy 
becomes a reality, the Corrnnuni ty can and does set'k to share the 
burden of us worldwide responsibilities in other, more appropriate 
ways. 
*"Turbulent Era: The Year of Europe in Retrospect, Florence, 1974.'' 
Report on the Fifth Meeting of Members of Congress and of the 
European Parliament, paper by International Institute of Strategic 
Studies (London), March 1974, House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Du1.}ication. 
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MY1H: TilE EUROPEAN COM\IJNITY' S PLANNED M)NETARY UNION MAY HAVE 
AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON Tiffi UNITED STATES AND Tiffi ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL 
M)NETARY SYSTEM. 
REALITY: In February 1971, the Community launched a three-stage 
plan for economic and monetary union (EMU) by the end of the decade. 
There is no reason to fear that plans for EMU will adversely affect 
the United States or other trading partners. The results will 
be quite the contrary, providing advantages to the Unitec States 
and benefiting, the entire international system. 
With economic and monetary union, the domestic monetary policies 
of the member countries will be fully coordinated, opening the way 
for a "European unit of account." The situation will be similar 
to that in the United States where economic and monetary policy is 
determined by the federal rather than state governments. This 
will ease international coordination of economic and monetary 
policies. Such coordination will be more efficient when carried 
out between several large economic and monetary entities rather 
than small units, thus making a stronger and healthier trading 
partner for the United States. 
In October 1972, the political leaders of the Nine reaffirmed their 
intention of proceeding with such a union by establishing a European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund, April 1, 1973, The second stage of EMU which 
will go through 1976, was begun this year. During this period, member 
states plan to continue working out conflicts in their economic policies 
and to consolidate other common policies. Employment and other 
social policies and regional policy have been marked for close 
attention during the second phase. 
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The consequences of the energy crisis on growth, employment, 
balance of payments, inflation, and instability of the international 
monetary system have slowed the pace toward EMU but also underlined 
the need for the Community to move toward that goal. The member 
countries can confront the current dangers by reinforcing 
their solidarity. 
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GNP. Gross national product, usually defined as the sum total of goods and 
services produced in an economy and net foreign investments. This term is not 
to be confused with gross domestic product which is the sum total of final 
goods and services, excluding intermediary production, produced within national 
borders, plus import taxes. 
KENNEDY ROUND. Trade negotiations which took place in the GATT from 1964 to 
1967. The impetus for the negotiations and US participation were made possible 
by the passage of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Resulted in lowering duties 
by some 35-40 per cent in industrial products, and somewl1at less in agriculture, 
through agreements covering some $40 billion in world trade. 
NONTARIFF BARRIERS. Provisions such as quotas, import regulations, buying 
policies, and freight rate differentials which restrict the flow nf ooods by 
means other than tariffs. 
OECD. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
UA. Unit of account. One unit of account equals one 1970 US dollar, 1.0857 
1972 dollars, or 1.20635 1973 dollars. Units of account are the Community's 
basic accounting unit. They are defined in terms of the gold weight of a 1970 
dollar. The Community did not change its definition after the US devaluation. 
UNCTAD. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
VAT. Value added tax. An indirect tax which has the effect of a retail sales 
tax. Tax is collected on the value added to a product at each stage that the 
product passes before reaching the consumer. 
YAOUNDE CONVENTION. Convention joining the Community to Madagascar 
and 18 African States which are former colonies of Community member states. 
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